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Abstract—We show that end-to-end learning of communication
systems through deep neural network (DNN) autoencoders can be
extremely vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks. Specifically,
we elaborate how an attacker can craft effective physical black-
box adversarial attacks. Due to the openness (broadcast nature)
of the wireless channel, an adversary transmitter can increase
the block-error-rate of a communication system by orders of
magnitude by transmitting a well-designed perturbation signal
over the channel. We reveal that the adversarial attacks are more
destructive than jamming attacks. We also show that classical
coding schemes are more robust than autoencoders against both
adversarial and jamming attacks. The codes are available at [1].
Index Terms—Adversarial attacks, Autoencoder systems, Deep
learning, Wireless security, End-to-end learning, Security and
Robustness of Deep Learning for Wireless Communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs), due to their promising
performance, are becoming an integral tool in many new dis-
ciplines [2]. This has created a new series of applications and
concepts in wireless communications under a new paradigm,
namely deep learning based wireless communications. One
such concept is the end-to-end learning of communication
systems using autoencoders [3]. As the name suggests, this
approach enables end-to-end optimization and design of com-
munication systems, which can potentially provide gains over
the contemporary modularized design of these systems.
DNNs, despite their promising performance, are extremely
susceptible to the so-called adversarial attacks [4], [5]. In
adversarial attacks, the attacker adds a (small) perturbation
p to the input of a DNN that causes erroneous outputs [4]. In
contrast to the conventional jamming attacks, this perturbation
is not noise but a deliberately optimized vector in the feature
space of the input domain that can fool the model. This
property of DNN has raised major concerns regarding their
security and robustness.
Adversarial attacks can be classified based on the nature
of the attack. They can specifically be divided into white-box
and black-box attacks, based on the amount of knowledge that
the adversary has about the underlying NN [6]. In white-box
attacks, the adversary has the full knowledge of the classifier,
while in black-box attacks the adversary has no or limited
knowledge of the classifier [6]. Adversarial attacks can also
be classified into digital and physical attacks based on the
degree of freedom that the adversary has with respect to its
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access to the input of the system [7]. In digital attacks, the
adversary can precisely design the input of the model, while
in physical attacks, the adversary indirectly applies the input
to the model [7].
Recently digital adversarial attacks on modulation classifica-
tion was studied in [8]. Therein, digital black-box attacks were
developed that can significantly reduce the performance of the
DNN based classifier. However, given the inherent random
nature of the wireless channel between the attacker and the
receiver in a wireless system, the feasibility of a digital attack
might be questioned. But physical attacks are more practical.
In this letter, we study physical adversarial attacks against
end-to-end autoencoder communication systems, and provide
the following contributions. First, we present new algorithms
for crafting effective physical black-box adversarial attacks.1
Second, we reveal that the adversarial attacks are more de-
structive than jamming attacks. Third, we show that classical
communication schemes are more robust than the end-to-end
autoencoder systems.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
An autoencoder communication system has three main
blocks, 1) transmitter, 2) channel, and 3) receiver [3]. The
system receives an input message s ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . ,M},
where M = 2k is the dimension of M with k being the
number of bits per message. The message is then passed to the
transmitter, where it applies a transformation f :M→ R2n 2
to the message s to generate the transmitted signal x = f(s) ∈
R2n. Similar to [3], the transmitter enforces an average power
constraint E[|x2i |] ≤ 0.5 ∀i. Next, the signal x is sent to the
receiver using the channel n times. In this work, we consider
an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel. Then, the
receiver receives a signal y, which contains the original signal
x, noise and other sources of interference. The receiver applies
the transformation g : R2n → M to create sˆ = g(y) which
is the estimate of the transmitted message s. To enable the
comparability of the results developed in different sections,
we set n = 7 and k = 4. This also enables us to compare our
results with the classical Hamming code (7,4).
In deep learning terminology the transmitter and receiver
are respectively called encoder and decoder and they are
implemented using neural networks [2]. The input signal s
first passes through the encoder. Then the output of the encoder
1Algorithmically, the method for perturbation generation suggested here
departs significantly from that in [8]. There is a superficial similarity in that
both use the SVD as a building block, but the problems and solutions are
different.
2Note that the output of the transmitter is an n dimensional complex vector
which is transformed to a 2n real vector.
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Block
Name
Layer
Name
Output
Dim.
Layer
Nmae
Output
Dim.
Encoder
Input M Input M
Dense+eLU M Dense + eLU M
Dense+Linear 2n conv1d+Flattening 16 × M
Normalization 2n Dense + Linear 2n
Normalization 2n
Channel noise(+ perturbation) 2n
noise
(+ perturbation) 2n
Decoder
Dense + ReLU M conv2d 16 × 2n
Dens+Softmax M conv2d+Flattening 8 × 2n
Dense + ReLU 2M
Dens + Softmax M
Table I: The structure of considered autoencoders.
(x) goes through the channel, where the attacker perturbation
signal (p) and the noise (n) are added to the x. Therefore the
output of the channel will be y = x + p + n. Then y is fed
to the decoder. This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 1.
To enable a benchmark for comparison, we use the same
autoencoder structure as [3], which is an MLP autoencoder.3
Also, we use a convolutional neural network (CNN) based
autoencoder to introduce the black-box adversarial attacks.
The structure of these networks is given in Table I.4 Detailed
explanations of each element of Table I can be found in
[2], [3]. We train the autoencoder in an end-to-end manner
using the Adam optimizer, on the set of all possible messages
s ∈M, using the cross-entropy loss function.
Encoder Decoder
Fig. 1: An adversarial attack against an autoencoder system.
III. CRAFTING A WHITE-BOX ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
Given the structure of an autoencoder in Fig. 1, the adver-
sary uses the broadcast nature of the channel and attacks the
decoder block of the autoencoder communication system. To
model the attack mathematically, let us denote the underlying
DNN classifier at the decoder by g : R2n →M. Also denote
w = x + n. The classifier generates an output sˆ = g(y) for
every input y = w+p. Note that when the attacker is absent
p = 0 and w = y. Given these definitions, an adversarial
perturbation p for the considered autoencoder is [4], [5]
min
p
‖p‖2 (1)
s.t. g(w + p) 6= g(w)
where n ∼ CN (0, σ2I) with σ2 = N0/2REb, Eb is energy
per bit, and R = k/n is the rate in bits per channel use.
3The selected set of hyperparameters is the same as in [3], to enable a direct
comparison, and we do not claim their optimality. There are infinitely many
combinations of hyperparameters that could be tested, but modifying them is
not likely to change the conclusions, as DNNs are known to be inherently
vulnerable to adversarial attacks, see [4], [7], [9].
4We also investigated some variations of the network structure, e.g., ReLU
activation, depth, different number of neurons. The results are quantitatively
similar. All the codes are available at [1].
Algorithm 1: Crafting Physical Adversarial Perturbations
Inputs:
• The full autoecoder’s model, e.g., g and the parame-
ters of the decoder’s underlying NN.
• The desired perturbation power ppower.
• The variance of the channel noise σ2.
Output: An input-agnostic adversarial perturbation, i.e., p
1: Initialize:
• Set number-of-samples ← 10.
• Set p← 0.
2: for i in range(number-of-samples) do
3: Choose an s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} uniformly at random.
4: Create a random noise n ∼ CN (0, σ2I).
5: Set sˆ← g (f(s) + p + n).
6: if sˆ == s then
7: Set w← w + p .
8: Solve (1) and denote its solution by pupdate.
9: if ‖p + pupdate‖22 ≤ ppower then
10: p← p + pupdate
11: else
12: p← √ppower p + pupdate‖p + pupdate‖2
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
Solving (1) is challenging as g does not have a convex
structure [4]. Therefore, a common approach is to use the so-
called fast gradient method (FGM) [4], [5], which finds an ap-
proximate solution to (1). The main idea is as follows. For the
input label s ∈M, denote the loss function of the autoencoder
by L(w+p, s). Then, FGM uses a Taylor expansion of the loss
function, i.e., L(w+p, s) ≈ L(w, s)+pT∇wL(w, s), and sets
p = α∇wL(w, s), where α is a scaling coefficient. Hence,
FGM effectively increases the loss function and provides an
approximation of p, given that the input (s) is known.5
An adversarial attacker cannot directly apply the FGM
method to attack an autoencoder communication system, as
the FGM method requires knowledge of the input to the
autoencoder, i.e., s, to create a perturbation p. However, the
attacker does not know what symbol is being transmitted. To
address this issue, Alg. 1 presents an iterative method to craft a
universal (i.e., input-agnostic) perturbation p that can fool the
autoencoder independently of its input. The main idea comes
from the literature on computer vision [9], where it has been
shown that by iteratively finding image-specific perturbations
one can create image-agnostic perturbations.
In the first line of the Alg. 1, we initialize the number
of samples and the perturbation p. The number of samples
determines the number of iterations we use in order to create
a universal perturbation. Then, we repeatedly apply the fol-
lowing steps. First, we select an input s uniformly at random
and pass it through the encoder. Next, we compute the signal
seen by the decoder, by adding the perturbation and the noise
5Further details and more advanced methods can be found in [4], [5], [8].
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Fig. 2: BLER versus Eb/N0 under Adversarial and Jamming
attacks against the MLP autoencoder in Table I.
to the output of encoder. Now we apply the decoder block and
obtain an estimate of the input, i.e., sˆ. If the decoder correctly
classifies the input message, we set w + p as w. Using the
new value of w and by solving (1), we search for an update
perturbation pupdate that enforces misclassification of the new
input. Then we update the existing perturbation p with pupdate
and check the power of the updated perturbation vector. If it is
below the desired perturbation power we keep it, otherwise, we
normalize it to meet the power constraint. Using this iterative
procedure, we are able to craft a universal perturbation p,
which is independent of the input of the autoencoder.
Figure 2 presents the block-error-rate (BLER) performance
of the MLP autoencoder of Table I, under adversarial attack.
The adversarial attack is designed using Alg. 1. To compare the
power of the adversarial perturbation at the receiver with the
received signal power, we define a metric called perturbation-
to-signal ratio (PSR), which is equal to the ratio of the
received perturbation power to the received signal power. For
the sake of comparison, we also consider a classical jamming
attack, where a jammer creates Gaussian noise with the same
PSR as the adversarial attack. Gaussian jamming is the most
effective way to reduce the mutual information for a message
encoded with a capacity-achieving Gaussian codebook (which
is optimum for the AWGN channel), under a given jamming
power constraint. Based on Fig. 2 it is clear that even for small
PSR values, the adversarial attack can degrade the BLER by
orders of magnitude. Also, the adversarial attack has a more
destructive impact compared to the jamming attack.
IV. CRAFTING SHIFT-INVARIANT BLACK-BOX ATTACKS
In Section III, we considered two restrictive assumptions
in order to craft adversarial perturbations. First, we assumed
that the adversarial attacker has perfect knowledge of the
autoencoder system, including the number of layers, weight
and bias parameters of the decoder block. Second, the attacker
is synchronous with the transmitter. More precisely, given
that p and x are 2n dimensional real vectors (n-dimensional
complex vectors), then p + x + n requires each element
of p to be added by its corresponding element of x. We
Algorithm 2: Crafting Shift-Invariant Perturbations
1: Using the substitute network, generate I adversarial per-
turbations using Alg. 1.
2: Calculate the BLER of a randomly shifted version of each
of the I perturbations on the substitute network.
3: Select the first t perturbations associated with the t least
BLERs. Denote them as {p1, . . . ,pt}.
4: Set Pnorm =
[
p1
‖p1‖2 ,
p2
‖p2‖2 , . . . ,
pt
‖pt‖2
]T
.
5: Calculate the SVD of Pnorm as Pnorm = UΣVT .
6: Select the first column of V as the candidate shift-invariant
perturbation, i.e., psi = V e1.
address these problems by applying a heuristic approach and
the transferability of adversarial attacks.
Consider the CNN autoencoder of Table I, and assume an at-
tacker is interested to create an adversarial attack for it, without
having any knowledge about its structure or parameters. The
transferability of adversarial attacks says that attacks designed
for a specific model are also effective for other models, with
high probability [6]. Therefore, the attacker can use its own
substitute autoencoder communication system and then design
a white-box attack for it, as it has the perfect knowledge of this
substitute autoencoder communication system. Then use the
designed perturbation to attack the original unknown model.
This attack is called a black-box adversarial attack [6].
Using this approach, we consider the MLP autoencoder
in Table I as the substitute model and create an adversarial
perturbation for it. Then, we use the so-created perturbation
to attack the CNN autoencoder in Table I, which is unknown
to the attacker. Note that this approach is general and we can
use it to attack other autoencoders with different structures
and parameters.
In order to remove the synchronicity requirement between
the attacker and the transmitter, we present a heuristic algo-
rithm, Alg. 2, to create attacks which are robust against random
time shifts. This is a challenging task due to the considered
setup: n=7 defines a low-dimensional input, whereas gener-
ally, finding effective adversarial attacks is easier the larger
the dimensions of the input and the model are [4].
The main ideas is as follows. Using the substitute network,
first we generate a pool of adversarial perturbations, e.g.,
I adversarial perturbations, using Alg. 1. Then, for each of
these I perturbations, we calculate the BLER of a randomly
shifted version of them. Next, we rank them based on the
severity of their attacks. Using this approach, the top t
perturbations show a robustness against random shifts. Note
that each of these t perturbations represents a direction in
the feature space that even a randomly shifted version of it
causes significant misclassification. Therefore, we can use a
singular value decomposition (SVD) of these t vectors to find
their main principal direction which hopefully would show a
better shift-invariant property. More details are given in Alg. 2.
Using the proposed algorithm, we are able to craft adversarial
attacks which are robust against random shifts, and therefore
a synchronous attack is not required.
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Fig. 3: BLER versus Eb/N0 for randomly shifted black-box
adversarial attacks against the CNN autoencoder in Table I.
Using a black-box attack and the heuristic method proposed
in Alg. 2, we attack the CNN autoencoder of Table I, while
we use the parameters of the MLP autoencoder of Table I. The
result is shown in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 reveals two important proper-
ties of non-synchronous black-box physical adversarial attacks
against end-to-end autoencoder communication systems. First,
they are significantly effective. Second, they can provide a
more destructive effect compared to jamming attacks.6
V. ROBUSTNESS OF AUTOENCODERS VS CLASSICAL
APPROACHES
In this section, we compare the robustness of the end-to-end
autoencoders with a classical modulation and coding scheme.
In [3], it has been shown that the end-to-end autoencoder
provides roughly the same BLER as binary phase-shift keying
(BPSK) modulation combined with a Hamming (7,4) code
and maximum-likelihood decoding (MLD). This also can be
verified from Fig. 4. We use BPSK modulation and Hamming
(7,4) coding with MLD as a benchmark and compare the
robustness of the CNN autoencoder in Table I with it. For the
attack, we use both the jamming attack and the shift invariant
black-box attack of Section III. The results are presented in
Fig. 4, where the PSR for both attacks is equal to −6 dB.
From Fig. 4, we make the following observations. First,
the randomly shifted black-box attack causes a bigger BLER
than a jamming attack for the considered autoencoder system.
Second, the BPSK modulation with Hamming coding and
MLD results in roughly the same BLER for both adversarial
and jamming attacks. Third, the classical BPSK modulation
with Hamming coding and MLD provides a smaller BLER
than the considered CNN autoencoder under a jamming attack.
Therefore, Fig. 4 suggests that the performance of the classical
approach is more robust, compared to autoencoders, against
both adversarial attacks and jamming attacks.
6In numerical experiments not included here due to space limitations, we
simulated 10 different models (with different weights and biases) and applied
the same attack to them. We observed the same trend as before, suggesting
that our conclusions are general and not specific to a particular model [1].
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Eb/N0 [dB]
10 6
10 5
10 4
10 3
10 2
10 1
Bl
oc
k-
er
ro
r r
at
e 
%
Black-box attack against Autoencoder
Jamming attack against Autoencoder
Black-box attack against BPSK and Hamming code with MLD
Jamming attack against BPSK and Hamming code with MLD
No Attack - Autoencoder
No attack - BPSK and Hamming code with MLD
Fig. 4: Comparison of the robustness of the autoencoder
(CNN, see Table I) and classical transmission (BPSK mod-
ulation with Hamming coding). The PSR is set to −6 dB.
VI. CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE WORKS AND FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS
We showed end-to-end autoencoder systems are signifi-
cantly vulnerable to small perturbations, which can decrease
their BLER by orders of magnitude. Due to the broadcast
nature of the wireless channel, creating such perturbations is
easy for an adversarial attacker. We also presented algorithms
to craft such physical adversarial attacks and verified them by
simulations. These findings suggest that defense mechanisms
against adversarial attacks and further research on the security
and robustness of deep-learning based wireless systems is a
necessity.
One possible defense mechanism is to train the autoencoder
with adversarial perturbations (which is a technique to increase
robustness and is known as adversarial training [4]). However,
adversarial training has its own drawbacks, e.g., the attacker
may use a different attack than the one used for training the
network. Also, the attacker can design adversarial perturba-
tions for an autoencoder that already has been trained with
adversarial training, and craft new adversarial perturbations.
Also, adversarial training can reduce the performance of the
autoencoder on clean inputs.
We also compared the robustness of a CNN-based end-to-
end autoencoder system with BPSK modulation and Hamming
coding and MLD. We showed that the classical approach
provides more robust performance against both adversarial and
jamming attacks, compared to the end-to-end autoencoder.
Our results were obtained for physical adversarial attacks
in AWGN channels, considering AWGN jamming. Further
studies are required to investigate other channel models (e.g.,
Rayleigh fading), a wider set of hyperparameters and infor-
mation rates (e.g., we only studied n = 7 and k = 4), and
comparisons against other, more advanced, jamming strategies
(see, e.g. [10]). For example, it is an open problem to deter-
mine more exactly, quantitatively, how the gap between the
jamming attack and the adversarial attack behaves as function
of the information rate. Also, the extension to more advanced
channel models, e.g., Rayleigh fading, is an interesting direc-
5tion for future work. In that case, the attacker must have an
estimate of the channel between himself and the receiver. The
quality of this estimate may fundamentally affect the degree
of success of the attacker. We hope that our initial results will
stimulate future research on this topic.
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